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Multiple Account Identity Deception Detection
in Social Media Using Non-Verbal Behavior
Michail Tsikerdekis and Sherali Zeadally, SMIEEE

Abstract—Identity deception has become an increasingly
important issue in the social media environment. The case of
blocked users initiating new accounts, often called sockpuppetry,
is widely known and past efforts, which have attempted to detect
such users, have been primarily based on verbal behavior (e.g.,
using profile data or lexical features in text). Although these
methods yield a high detection accuracy rate, they are
computationally inefficient for the social media environment,
which often involves databases with large volumes of data. To
date, little attention has been paid to detecting online deception
using non-verbal behavior. We present a detection method based
on non-verbal behavior for identity deception, which can be
applied to many types of social media. Using Wikipedia as an
experimental case, we demonstrate that our proposed method
results in high detection accuracy over previous methods
proposed while being computationally efficient for the social
media environment. We also demonstrate the potential of nonverbal behavior data that exists in social media and how
designers and developers can leverage such non-verbal
information in detecting deception to safeguard their online
communities.
Index Terms— Algorithm, deception, identity, performance,
social media

I. INTRODUCTION

I

N the past decade we have experienced an increasing level
of interest in online social media, which enable users to not
only create content but also exchange it using Web 2.0
technologies [1]. The number of users registering with social
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter keeps
increasing at a rapid pace amounting to 82 percent of the
world’s online population [2]. Social network usage has
increased by 64% since 2005 [3]. The ease with which we can
generate online profiles at a low cost has also led to ample
opportunities for identity deception, which at times can have
fatal consequences. A recent well-known example is the case
of a mother pretending to be a teenage boy on the social
networking site MySpace in order to obtain information from
a teenage girl eventually leading to the girl committing suicide
[4]. Other social media services such as collaborative projects
have to engage in “cat-mouse” games by constantly having to
Copyright (c) 2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be
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block user accounts for individuals joining in with different
account names not long after a block has been applied.
Solutions have been proposed that can assist in detecting
multiple accounts owned by the same individual but their
effectiveness vary in terms of computational efficiency and
complexity of practical implementation depending on the
availability of the appropriate data [5], [6]. Moreover, these
past methods have mainly focused on detecting deception
through verbal communication (e.g., speech or text) and have
ignored the potential of non-verbal (e.g., user activity or
movement) deception detection, which has shown high
success rates in the offline world [7], considering that nonverbal cues are 4.3 times more powerful than verbal cues in
face-to-face communication [8]. This is a promising detection
method that we have identified in our previous work and for
which we presented experimental results in [9].
In this paper we propose a novel approach that makes use of
user non-verbal behavior data in social media in order to
detect multiple account identity deception. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present an
overview on deception and identity deception, and discuss
some of the problems with current identity deception detection
methods and highlight the research contributions of this paper.
In Section III, we describe our proposed method. Section IV
presents the performance results obtained with our proposed
method. Finally, Section V discusses the implications of our
proposed technique in the growing field of identity deception
detection for the social media domain.
II. RELATED WORKS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK
A. Deception and Identity Deception
Deception has been defined as the deliberate transfer of
false information to a recipient that is not aware that the
information received has been falsified [6], [10]. In nature it
can be seen as a mechanism for gaining a strategic advantage
[11]. Similarly, human deception is motivated by instrumental
(goal-driven), relational (relationship-driven) and identitydriven goals [12]. The intent behind these goals may be benign
(e.g., white lies) or hostile [13]. Online, the success of an
attempt to deceive others is dependent upon multiple factors
associated with the components involved: deceiver, social
medium, potential victim and deceptive action [9]. Factors that
affect a deceiver’s behavior and effectiveness in achieving
deception include a deceiver’s expectations, goals,
motivations, his/her relation to target and a target’s degree of
suspicion [12]. The last element in particular has been found

to indirectly affect human deception detection rates [14]. A
deceiver’s goal is to use everything at his/her disposal to keep
a low suspicion from his/her target and this applies to both
verbal and non-verbal behaviors. There is also a moral cost for
a deceiver that will affect the likelihood of using deception
[15]. The software design of the social medium also affects
deception through factors such as the perceived level of
security provided by the system along with mechanisms that
enhance trust and make assurances [16]. The deceptive action
transmitted through cyberspace also has attributes such as the
number of targets and the expiry date associated with it that
influence its success [9]. Finally, a victim’s ability to detect
deception is an important factor that influences deception
success. Humans have been consistently shown to be bad
deception detectors [17]. Another important factor is a
victim’s Information Communication Technology (ICT)
literacy [9]. For example, in a study involving Internet fraud
through page-jacking techniques (developing fake pages of
legitimate websites) only a handful of individuals detected
inconsistencies with the fake websites [16].
Deception is achieved by manipulating content, the
communication channel, the sender information, or any
combinations of these three components [9]. Manipulating
content involves tampering with images [18] or even text as
can be seen in collaborative projects such as Wikipedia where
special user task forces are focused on monitoring for text
manipulation with the intention to spread inaccurate
information [5]. Communication channels can be tampered
with to disrupt communications of a user in an attempt to
access his/her account or cause confusion between two parties
(e.g., a case that can be observed online in video gaming
consoles) [19].
Identity deception (a subcategory of deception) focuses on
manipulating the sender’s information [20] and can be divided
into three categories: identity concealment (e.g., concealing or
altering part of an individual’s identity), identity theft (e.g.,
mimicking another person’s real identity) and identity forgery
(e.g., forging a fictional identity) [6]. Of particular interest for
social media is identity forgery. Social media services tend to
allow individuals to easily register new accounts without a
thorough verification of an identity. In fact, an individual can
have an unlimited number of accounts appearing as seemingly
different users to unsuspected individuals.
B. Deception Detection
Deception detection theories are divided into those that are
based on leakage cues (cues sent by the deceiver unwillingly
due to factors such as cognitive overload) and strategic
decisions (cues indicative of deception that are willingly
transmitted by a deceiver in order to ensure deception success)
[21]. To detect deception, both categories pick up cues from
verbal and non-verbal communications.
Human deception detection is arguably the most widely
used method. Individuals can pick up cues from the
environment in which an interaction takes place (e.g., a
photograph that looks edited) with a deceiver and interpret
these cues by understanding a deceiver’s goals [16]. The most

critical factor in detecting deception is the time, which can
vary from days to months, until a truth is uncovered by a
previously deceived individual [22]. However, people are bad
at detecting deception with detection success bounded
between 55 to 60 percent [23] at best while others have
measured an even lower success of 34 percent [24]. Even
more troublesome is that a study has found that upon training
people in detecting verbal and non-verbal cues detection
accuracy actually decreased [25]. A more standardized
perspective of examining deception detection is necessary to
achieve and engineer deception detection solutions with high
success rates.
Three of the most popular theories used in the deception
field are Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), Leakage
Theory (LT), and Expectancy Violations Theory (EVT) [21],
[26]. In IDT, deception is seen as a series of exchanges
between the deceiver and the victim. IDT sees deception as a
goal-driven event. After each exchange, the deceiver adapts
his/her behavior depending on the responses that he/she
receives from his/her potential victim [12]. The adjustments
made by the deceiver give away verbal and non-verbal
indications for deception. IDT has been used as the theoretical
premise for developing a framework for intent detection in
deception (detecting whether intent is hostile or benign) [13].
Similarly, Leakage Theory also involves detecting
indicators for deception but these are delivered unwillingly by
the deceiver due to an inability to reproduce the equivalent of
a truthful behavior in terms of verbal and non-verbal behavior
[27]. One possible explanation for this behavior is the
cognitive overload created by a deceiver who attempts to
control multiple facets of his/her behavior. In addition, a
deceiver’s awareness may also play a role in the types of cues
that are leaked. People are naturally adapted to have a good
control over their facial expression while body language
(especially that of the lower body) is often seen as less useful
from a deceiver. Similarly, in social media non-verbal
behavior such as the time taken to type a text (although this
can vary in different contexts) is likely to be seen as a
deception cue by a deceiver much like pauses in speech help
distinguish deceptive from non-deceptive speech [28].
Finally, Expectancy Violations Theory states that a person’s
normal behavior (e.g., baseline behavior) and the context in
which this behavior takes place should also be considered
[26], [29]. Instead of looking for indicators of deception, one
can focus on comparing an expected interaction (based on
one’s baseline and context) with a received interaction. Any
discrepancies between a baseline and an actual behavior can
signal some probability for deception. For example, a profile
page from an experienced social networking user is expected
to vary compared to that of a freshly registered user. EVT has
been used as the conceptual background for detecting
deception through digital analysis of head and hand
movements [26].
C. Identity Deception Detection
A particular issue with identity deception in social media is
the presence of multiple identities by one user. Both online

and offline studies have been conducted in an attempt to solve
the problem of detecting duplicate account records. Wang et
al. [6] in their study attempted to identify duplicate records in
a criminal database using a variety of similarity-based
detection algorithms. Attributes such as name, address, social
security number and date of birth from a criminal database
were compared as strings using a string comparator and the
level of disagreement for these items was obtained between
different user records. Furthermore, they obtained the overall
disagreement between records based on these attributes, and
those matches that had a disagreement below a certain
threshold were considered as the same account. The most
direct solution to identify duplicates in a database with the
highest accuracy is a cross-comparison for the full length of
accounts in a database. If one simply compares each account
to all other accounts in the database this results in high
computational overheads of O(N2). The solution adopted by
Wang et al. was to use an adaptation of the Sorted
Neighborhood Method (SNM). The original SNM develops a
sorting key, sorts a database and then merges the duplicate
records using a window of fixed size w that moves through the
sorted records. The adapted SNM version has a shorter
window w’, where w’ is smaller than w. The window in the
adapted version is smaller since once a duplicate record is
found the rest of the comparisons for a window are ignored.
The method produced high detection accuracy (80.4% for a
dataset containing missing values for the previously
mentioned attributes and 98.6% for a dataset without missing
values) with a computational complexity of O(w’N). The
adapted SNM version took 6.5 minutes to complete with 1.3
million records while a record comparison (first approach)
would have taken 87 days on the same machine. However, the
time complexity for the adapted SNM does not include the
sorting of the database. Furthermore, the method is focused on
identity concealment and probably has limited application for
cases of identity forgery where verbal information (e.g.,
profile text) in social media can be freely manipulated to an
extraordinary degree compared to criminal databases. Finally,
social media include a variety of types varying from blogs to
social networking sites and even virtual social world that
differ drastically in terms of what they offer to their users and
their databases tend to be even larger than criminal databases.
A more recent study by Solorio et al. attempted to detect
sockpuppets (these are new accounts of previously blocked
users) on Wikipedia [5]. They used natural language
processing techniques to detect users who maintain multiple
accounts based on their verbal output. Textual features were
used such as punctuation count, quotation count or the
variation between using capital or lowercase “I”. These
features were tested against all revisions made by the users on
pages throughout Wikipedia. Due to the volume of users on
Wikipedia in conjunction with the number of revisions that
each account may have (which can reach thousands), the
similarity-based method used to identify a positive match
between two accounts needs to receive manual input (an
individual needs to set which two accounts need to be
compared). As such, the method can be considered as a

human-augmenting deception detection technique since it
requires individuals to provide input for two potential
accounts that match. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) model
has shown 68.83% overall accuracy against an experimental
dataset of 77 cases of legitimate users and sockpuppets. The
limitation of this method is its computational cost involved if
one would like to test all accounts against all accounts in a
database; a time complexity of O((N*R)2) where R is the
number of revisions made by a user. Testing every new
account against all accounts currently in the database would
result in a time complexity of O(N*R).
The two aforementioned methods described earlier
demonstrate the limited capabilities of using verbal
communication to detect identity deception using account
comparison techniques. These methods yield relatively high
levels of detection accuracy. However, the cost for such
accuracy may be too high for detecting duplicate accounts on
social media. Similarity analyses, when used to evaluate a
newly registered user with the rest of the database, also incur
high computational overheads. Moreover, as we mentioned in
a previous work [9], verbal deception detection as a detection
methodology completely ignores non-verbal aspects, which
have shown to be highly effective in exposing deceivers [26],
[30]. The most common argument based on the literature [11],
[21] is the fact that in the case of the online environment, a
deceiver will maximize his/her effort in ensuring that his/her
verbal behavior does not expose the deception being carried
out.
D. Contributions of this work
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows:
 We propose a computationally efficient method
(applicable to all social media classifications [1]) for
detecting identity deception through the use of nonverbal user activity in the social media environment.
This contribution ensures that a relatively high level
of overall detection accuracy is obtained that is
comparable to similar methods that make use of
verbal communication [5], [6] but with lower
computational overheads.
 To demonstrate the computational efficiency (to
withstand the immense traffic experienced by social
media services) of our proposed non-verbal method
to deception detection we use publicly available data
from Wikipedia and machine learning algorithms.
 Finally, we present design guidelines for designers
and developers interested in implementing this
method as an added level of security for their social
media communities and additional considerations
based on various social media classifications in
existence today.
III. PROPOSED METHOD FOR DETECTING ONLINE IDENTITY
DECEPTION
A. Research Objectives
Our research goal in this work is to develop a method that

can automatically detect online identity deception, which can
be very useful in many online social media scenarios. For
instance, one scenario where such detection would be useful is
in the case of an open source software development
collaborative project website where, for security reasons,
allows just one account per individual. Since new account
registration is available to anyone, a user can therefore register
an unlimited number of times every time his/her account gets
blocked. Succeeding in identity deception is important for a
deceiver who wants to inject malicious code into a project.
Once an account is discovered, all changes made to the code
by the owner of that account will be investigated and closely
examined. We argue that an early detection system can help
identify those individuals who experience a disproportionate
familiarity with the collaborative software (according to their
non-verbal behavior), which may indicate that they are not in
fact newcomers or novices. Post-examination and close
monitoring of suspect cases will help ensure the security of an
open source project.
In this work, we investigate answers to the following
research questions: Can a user’s non-verbal behavior in social
media be effectively used in detecting identity deception in
terms of multiple account ownership and is it more effective
than previously proposed methods in the literature which used
verbal similarity searching?
Can the method be implemented with high computational
efficiency and low overheads in large social media
environment where we often have a large number of users?
To demonstrate our proposed method’s effectiveness we use
Wikipedia, which falls under the collaborative projects
classification of social media [1] (shown in Table I), as our
experimental case. We used publicly available data for
Wikipedia in order to evaluate our approach. It is worth
pointing out that although we have used Wikipedia as an
example of a social medium, our method can be applied to
virtually any other social medium environment. We briefly
describe below some of the non-verbal user activities that can
be observed on Wikipedia before describing our proposed
method.
TABLE I
SOCIAL MEDIA CLASSIFICATIONS
Self-presentation / Self-disclosure
Social
presence
/ Media
richness

Low
↓
High

Low
Collaborative projects
Social news sites
Content communities
Virtual game worlds

High
Blogs
Microblogging
Social networking sites
Virtual social worlds

Table derived from previous publications [1], [9].

B. The Wikipedia Environment
Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia in which everyone
can contribute without an account (anonymously when only IP
address is visible) and with an account using a pseudonym or
even real name. Wikipedia operates on the concept of
namespaces where each namespace is meant to include a
specific type of content (or pages). For example, all

encyclopedic articles belong to the “(Main/Article)”
namespace (with numeric identifier 0) whereas all article
discussions (involving discussions on improving articles and
resolving issues) belongs to its own namespace (“Talk”
namespace with numeric identifier 1). Wikipedia’s policy
pages and discussion on Wikipedia proposals or projects
belong to different namespaces. Wikipedia has 28
namespaces.
Users leave a revision footprint on pages when they make a
change to them. A page revision log is maintained for each
page where everyone can find who did a specific revision, the
revision itself and other associated matters relating to the
revision (when it was made, how many bytes were added or
removed from a page). A single user interaction with the
Wikipedia’s environment and two of its namespaces are
illustrated in Fig. 1. The logged data on page revisions provide
us with non-verbal user behavior on Wikipedia. For example,
the time taken between each revision is a measurable nonverbal behavior.

Fig. 1. An example of user activity on Wikipedia along with associated nonverbal activity.

C. Non-verbal Behavior Variables
We used simple and more complex variables to represent
user behavior. Variables of online non-verbal behavior fall
under two major categories: time-independent and timedependent (henceforth these variables are denoted with index
t).
We started with the number of total revisions (Rt) made by
a user for a specific time window since their initial registration
with the website. In addition, we obtained the number of
revisions as they were distributed in the various namespaces
such as article (Rat), article discussion (Rdt), user page (Rut),
user discussion page (Rtt), Wikipedia-related pages and
Wikipedia-related discussion pages combined under one
variable (Rwt). A final category was added for all the rest of
the namespaces such as file uploads, images etc. (Rot). Based
on these namespaces we also used a variable called the Gini
coefficient that represents differences in activity distribution
across these namespaces (bounded between 0 and 1) and is
formally defined as [31]:
(1)

where x represents the set of items (revisions on each
namespace for our case) and w is the relevant weight that may
be assigned to each item. Equal weights were applied to our
data because, conceptually, namespaces on Wikipedia do not
hold any weight and any attempt to assign weights would
introduce a bias. In addition, we measured the mean number
of bytes of bytes added or removed by all revisions:
(2)
The total number of bytes added (Bat) and total number of
bytes removed (Brt) from all the revisions during the
observation window were also calculated. Furthermore, the
time difference in seconds between the time (TR) a user
registered their account until the time of the first revision was
measured along with the namespace (FE) where their first
revision was made. Finally, the average duration (ADt)
between revisions was used and is defined as follows:

time changing references to Horana Royal College to Royal
College, Horana against consensus. Similar behavior has been
shown by User:Xe2oner, User:Wo2gana, User:Samudrab all
of whom have been blocked as socks of Masu 7. ” Individuals
like this user attempt to deceive without getting caught and
this is revealed by the time taken to block these accounts since
the initial first revision on Wikipedia. On average it takes
approximately 75 days for a sockpuppet account to get
blocked (median is 3.19 days) as evident in our block log
dataset. Fig. 2 depicts all the sockpuppet cases showing their
first revision and time when the account was blocked. About
38.96 percent of sockpuppets have their accounts blocked
during the first day after their first revision on Wikipedia. Ten
days after their first revision, the percentage of sockpuppets
being caught rises to 62.24. By 30 days, the percentage rises to
74.43. It is quite clear that, while many users are caught early
on, others evade detection for a considerable amount of time.

(3)
where n is the total number of revisions and T is the set of
all Unix times for each revision made.
D. Data Retrieval and Model Testing
We collected a list of all publicly available logs of blocked
users on Wikipedia during the period since February 2004
until October 2013. The logs include various reasons for
blocking user accounts including account blocks for verified
sockpuppet cases (examples of block logs shown in Table II).
Using regular expressions we kept only sockpuppet cases with
an infinite time of block issued for these accounts.
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF USER BLOCKS FOUND IN WIKIPEDIA BLOCK LOGS
Example of user block due to
vandalism (e.g., adding false or
Example of user block due to
inaccurate information to pages
sockpuppetry
with malicious intent)
id="4933953"
id="4933944"
user="198.202.26.110"
user="Niroshvthanaw"
by="Ronhjones"
by="Anna Frodesiak"
timestamp="2013-12timestamp="2013-1230T00:23:57Z"
29T23:56:29Z"
expiry="2014-01-13T00:23:57Z"
expiry="infinity"
reason="[[WP:Vandalism|Vandalis reason="Abusing [[WP:Sock
m]]"
puppetry|multiple accounts]]: See
[[Wikipedia:Sockpuppet
investigations/Masu7]]"

These are users who make a great effort in using deception
to masquerade as legitimate users while still trying to achieve
their end goals (e.g., altering a text in a particular article page).
For example, in the page that holds the discussion1 over the
block of user “Niroshvthanaw” the following is written about
the account puppeteer: “Masu 7 has created another sock, this
1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Sockpuppet_investigations/
Masu7/Archive

Fig. 2. Scatterplot showing the time when a sockpuppet made the first
revision and the time when the account was blocked.

For testing our proposed method we sampled 7,500 cases
of sockpuppets. In addition, we retrieved a list of all users who
made at least one revision through the revision records on all
Wikipedia namespaces (these are provided as dump xml files
and were parsed). Verified sockpuppet cases were removed
from this list and an additional sample of non-blocked users
was obtained so that our final user list contained 7,500 verified
sockpuppet cases and 7,500 legitimate user cases. As such, a
fair coin toss for our sample would produce approximately
50% accuracy in detecting sockpuppets. Human deception
detection is usually placed at much lower rates (as low as 3050%) [24].
For each one of these users in our total sample (sockpuppets
and legitimate users) we obtained all activity on Wikipedia.
This activity can be translated into variables which can help us
test models (e.g., a model can consist of one or more variables
described previously) for our proposed method. The time

window set for the user activity will affect all time-dependent
non-verbal behavior variables and in turn the efficiency of a
model in terms of its predictive accuracy. It will also force
some of the cases in our sample to be omitted due to inactivity
(e.g., a user who made his/her first revision two hours after
registration would be omitted from the sample if the time
window is set for an hour after registration). We obtain all
activity for users in the first 30 days. The users in the sample
were not banned before these 30 days. Those who have not
been active for that time window were excluded because
without the presence of any behavior we cannot build a
classification. The final sample (for 30 days of user activity)
consisted of a total of 12,723 users of which roughly 48.23
percent were sockpuppets. We calculated all variables of nonverbal behavior for all users in our sample. Just like in the real
world, these variables are similar to measuring non-verbal
behavior accompanying verbal interactions such as measuring
the speed of delivery of a speech of a person and looking for
deviations from a context specific baseline.
Time-dependent variables are likely to affect our models
depending on the time t we would set when testing their
performance (and subsequently the overall performance of our
proposed method). We hypothesized that since Wikipedia
does not encourage the use of multiple accounts, the
expectation is that a newly registered user will also behave as
a newcomer. Newcomers are generally unfamiliar with the
environment (or then tend to exhibit limited familiarity with
the system). In contrast, a deceiver is not only expected to be
familiar with the Wikipedia space but to be also very familiar
with many of the norms and behaviors of legitimate users.
Since deception can be easily detected through verbal
communication (e.g., the textual contents of a revision), a
deceiver is likely to be extra cautious when delivering text. In
contrast, control over a deceiver’s non-verbal behavior is less
likely because he/she is not aware that this may be monitored
and it is less obvious to him/her while interacting with the
social medium. In addition, long-term behaviors among
deceivers and real users are expected to vary. To be able to
identify the best time window we have calculated all nonverbal, time-dependent variables for each hour during the first
30 days of activity for all users in the sample. Then the
standardized difference between sockpuppets and real users
was calculated for each variable and the trend was represented
using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Fig. 3). For the
standardized difference we used the correlation coefficient
produced by point-biserial correlation:
(4)
where sn is the standard deviation, M1 is the mean of a
variable (e.g., Rt) for the sockpuppet group A and M0 is the
mean of the same variable for the legitimate user group, n1 is
the number of data points for group A, n2 is the number of
data points for group B, and, n is the total number of data
points for both groups.
There are substantial differences for some variables early on

Fig. 3. Variation of differences in non-verbal user activity variables between
sockpuppets and legitimate users over a period of a month. Positive scores
along the y axis indicate increased activity for sockpuppets whereas negative
scores indicate decreased activity for sockpuppets compared to legitimate
users.

but behaviors of deceivers seem to deviate more as time
progresses. This is evident particularly for variables Rt, GRt,
Rdt and Rtt where changes in the correlation coefficient are
particularly large. Moreover, in some cases (e.g., GRt)
deceptive accounts seem to deviate from legitimate accounts
in a negative trend. In this particular case, we note that
sockpuppets tend to distribute their efforts in more
namespaces as time progresses in contrast to legitimate users.
Others tend to reach a maximum and then stabilize or reach a
lower value and then become stable. In most cases, it seems
that, as time progresses a deceiver’s behavior tends to deviate

more than that of a legitimate user. This is similar to real life
human deception detection where time is an important factor
for uncovering a lie [22] due to the likelihood of exposing
such deviations.
To identify the differences in accuracy as time progresses
we have calculated several models (Mxt) for t = 1 day (11,207
cases, baseline for non-sockpuppet cases at 52.86%) and t =
30 days after registration (12,723 cases, baseline for nonsockpuppet cases at 51.77%). We developed several binary
outcome models aimed at using these non-verbal behavior
variables to detect identity deception. The following models
were developed:




bounded between 0 and 1 that combines recall and precision),
accuracy (the fraction of true positives and true negatives
returned over the total number of cases), false positive rate
(indicating the rate of falsely identified sockpuppets), and
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) (a performance
metric used in machine learning that provides a balanced
result even if cases in the sample vary substantially in size).
These performance metrics are formally defined as follows
[34]:
(5)
(6)
(7)


(8)




(9)


(10)

IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We used a popular set of machine learning algorithms,
which includes Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random
Forest (RF) and Adaptive Boosting (ADA), to implement our
proposed models. A description of how these algorithms work
is beyond the scope of this paper but more details can be
found in books describing them [32], [33]. However, it should
be noted that all the selected algorithms used are considered
ideal for models that involve binary outcomes as it was the
case in our study [32].
A. Performance Metrics Used
To evaluate the efficiency of our models for our proposed
method we used the following classification matrix shown in
Table III.
TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION MATRIX USED TO EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF A
MODEL-ALGORITHM PAIR
Verified Identity
Deception
Verified Legitimate User
(Sockpuppetry)
Predicted
True Positive (TP)
False Positive (FP)
Identity
Deception
(Sockpuppetry)
Predicted
False Negative (FN)
True Negative (TN)
Legitimate User

Using this matrix, we derive results to measure the
following performance metrics in order to evaluate the
performance of our models for our proposed method: recall
(the fraction of valid sockpuppet cases that are returned),
precision (the fraction of returned cases that are valid
sockpuppet cases), F-measure (the test of a model’s accuracy

B. Experimental Procedure
To evaluate the performance efficiency of our models for
our proposed method we repeated ten times a ten-fold crossvalidation procedure to obtain the mean values for all of our
performance metrics. Algorithm 1 is used to evaluate our
models. The algorithm involves splitting the data in ten parts
and using nine of them to build a model whereas one part is
used for testing the model.
procedure TenTimesTenFoldCrossValidation()
// Algorithm builds a single model (e.g., RF) and produces final results
Set a predefined number w
LOOP: n for T=[1,2,…,9,10]
Set random seed
Create fold sample list FLi by randomly assigning fold numbers to
the full length of dataset
6.
LOOP: f in TT=[1,2,…,9,10]
7.
Build Random Forest model RF based on training data (FLi not
equal to f) and S
8.
Calculate predictions Pi using RF for testing data (FLi equal to f)
9.
Set Oi as observed values (is or is not a sockpuppet) based on
testing data
10.
Build classification matrix using observed Oi and predicted Pi
values
11.
Calculate Recall REf, Precision PRf, and F-measure FMf
12.
END LOOP
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

13.

Calculate

,

, and

14. END LOOP
15. Calculate

,

, and

End TenTimesTenFoldCrossValidation
Algorithm 1. A repeated ten times ten-fold cross-validation algorithm for
testing a model using random forest.

The algorithm is sequentially executed until all possible ten
combinations have been used. This process is repeated ten
times and each time we used a different seed for splitting the
dataset. We used this algorithm because it has been previously
proven to produce highly accurate estimates in terms of how
models (and as a result our overall method) would perform in
previously unseen data [32].
Test results obtained are presented in Figs. 4a, 4b, 4c for all
models and algorithms used. These are rounded to three
decimal digits.
We summarize the results obtained with our proposed
detection method compared to two other previously proposed
approaches and the results are summarized in the Table IV.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF IDENTITY DECEPTION DETECTION TECHNIQUES FOR MULTIPLE
ACCOUNTS OWNED BY THE SAME USER.
Non-Verbal
Natural
Expectancy
Adaptive SVM
Language
Violations
Text Attribute
Processing
Detection
Disagreement
Similarity
(Our Proposed
Algorithm [6]
Searching [5]
Detection
Method)
Overall
80.4% - 98.6%
68.8%
71.3%
accuracy
Indicators used
Verbal
Verbal
Non-verbal
(Verbal can be
added however)
Limitations
Limited to
Limited to
Limited to
cases where
cases where
cases where
profile
text is
data on user
attributes are
communicated
activity is
provided
through
available
Efficiency for
O(w’N’) (N’ is
O(N*R) (N
O(1*R’), R’ is a
analyzing a
smaller than the number of users limited amount
newly
total number of
in database and
of revisions
registered user
users in
R all revisions
(R’<R) made
database
made by each
by the user in
focusing on
user)
question in the
records close to
window of
the new
observation
account)
Time of
As soon as data
As soon as a
After a set time
application
is added on a
user posts a text window (e.g.,
profile (missing somewhere
12 hours) that
values are
(preferably
distinguishes
allowed)
enough cases
newcomer from
for the
old user
algorithm to
pick up on
cues)
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Fig. 4a. SVM results for all models.
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Based on the results obtained, we found that Adaptive
Boosting appears to provide the best balance between recall
and precision whereas maintaining the highest achieved
accuracy. Recall levels are relatively high (64.8 percent for the
best case) which means that most cases are picked up by the
our proposed method. In terms of precision, we found that a
relatively large amount of false positives is obtained (best case
RF M430 still results in 25.5 percent of false positives). This is
not necessarily a bad result if the detection method is not
implemented so that it automatically blocks suspect cases. If

M4₃₀

Fig. 4b. RF results for all models.
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Fig. 4c. ADA results for all models.
Fig. 4. Performance results for all models and algorithms used in this study.
Y-axis represents results for all of our performance metrics (bounded
between 0 and 1).

the detection method is used to report suspect cases so that
administrators can keep a close eye on or restrict certain
features for suspect accounts for a time period, then recall is
the most important feature and low precision can be tolerated.
The machine learning algorithms that we used in this study
usually provide higher accuracy results than traditional models
(e.g., binary logistic regression [35]) used in statistical
research). However, they are “black-boxes” in the sense that
they produce results but it is less evident how variables affect
a prediction. The adaptive boosting package in R (ada) does
offer a measure of the importance of variables that are
included in a model [36]. The measure calculates how each
variable improves the predictive accuracy. We present results
for variable importance for
based on the adaptive
boosting algorithm shown in Fig. 5. In conjunction with
theresults shown in Fig. 3, the distribution of edits is a
powerful predictor for deception just as we hypothesized that
is likely to be. Deceivers have a higher probability of
delivering content to multiple namespaces as opposed to
newcomers who are less likely to do so. The total number of
revisions made by a deceiver also demonstrate that deceivers
tend to be more active and in namespaces other than the
article’s namespace. Moreover, the average duration between
revisions shows that deceivers take longer times between
posting their revisions. A plausible explanation for this result
is that deceivers need to take longer to make strategic
decisions to ensure success for their deception.

Fig. 5. Variable importance plot for
algorithm.

based on the adaptive boosting

The results obtained show that the use of non-verbal user
activity is a viable and efficient method for detecting identity
deception (specifically sockpuppetry). Our method achieved
an overall accuracy of 71.3% in identifying deceivers. The
method also incurs a much lower computational overhead over
previous methods while achieving an overall accuracy that
renders it a valid choice for an early filtering system.

Moreover, although we have used Wikipedia as an example of
a social medium, this deception detection method can be
applied to other social media domains. In fact, the detection
method can be used with any social media service that
contains user footprints that are not only verbal (e.g., text,
audio, video) but also non-verbal (e.g., frequency of posting,
time between updates, length or duration of messages).
Moreover, the method also demonstrated the value of using
non-verbal communication to detect identity deception in real
time with limited resources (given that it is computationally
efficient).
One possible explanation as to why our proposed detection
method is effective can be found from IDT and LT. A
deceiver is constantly evaluating the receiver and is
continuously adjusting his or her behavior accordingly. Such
adjustments are likely to be applied to what a deceiver can
perceive as something communicated to a receiver and other
third parties present within the observable vicinity of a
deceiver. Non-verbal activity for a deceiver is less likely to be
perceived as monitored especially in a digital environment. In
addition, even if such activity is controlled, certain cues will
still leak and leave a footprint which others can make use of
later on. For example, the impatience of sending messages to
multiple namespaces right after an account registration is less
likely to be controlled. Based on results obtained in this work,
we argue that a deceiver is less likely to attribute importance
to non-verbal activity on social media. The deceiver is less
aware that there is a footprint for that online activity, and also
less aware that others can detect this footprint and he or she is
also likely to have less control over controlling such nonverbal activity.
Our results have also contributed to a new perspective on
sockpuppetry where it is a challenging to detect identity
deception. Our results show that in online communities where
one account per user is enforced by a social media service’s
policy, sockpuppets will deviate from the baseline behavior of
newcomers. This deviation is in line with EVT and we have
demonstrated that sockpuppets tend to be more active than
newcomers possibly due to their prior knowledge and skills
with various other systems.
A. Limitations of our Proposed Detection Method
The efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed detection
method is influenced by several context specific factors. The
time window set for observing early new user behavior has a
significant impact on the method’s effectiveness. It can also
affect the efficiency if the window is too large given that more
data will be needed to be examined by the detection method.
Another issue is the identification of measurable non-verbal
behavior in social media. We have demonstrated a couple of
examples in our paper. More work is needed in the future to
implement such a method to identify the most optimum set of
variables that can assist in detecting identity deception and are
also computationally efficient. However, our method based on
the expectancy violations theory is still superior in deception
detection compared to methods of similarity searching and
text comparative methods used by other previously proposed

detection techniques [5], [6] . Finally, the social medium
under examination will also determine the data that can be
used. It is worth pointing out that although our method is
portable to any social media classification, adaptations may be
needed to ensure its proper implementation. Research is a
necessary step to identify what non-verbal behaviors can be
consistently and quantitatively be translated into variables that
can be included in a predictive model. These behaviors will
need to be good indicators (at least conceptually) of a
substantial difference between how legitimate and deceitful
users operate. After these variables are identified, one will
need to develop models to find the most optimum model with
the highest predictive accuracy. It requires a lot of work up
front but the computational and practical efficiency of the
method may prove beneficial to other social media services.

[3]

B. Future work
Future work will need to examine other non-verbal behavior
variables in different social media services that can be used as
good indicators of deception. Moreover, combining research
on verbal detection deception with the non-verbal behavior
deception detection method presented in this study may help
improve prediction accuracy.

[8]

VI. CONCLUSION

[11]

Despite the explosive growth of social media applications
and networks, deception in social media environment is an
area that has not received commensurate attention from
researchers, designers, and developers. Identity deception in
particular is something that has haunted the Internet with a
number of incidents receiving attention because of the ease of
creating new accounts. Given the increasing number of
Internet users and social media users, identity deception is
likely to increase and the discussion on deception detection
will become even more important. There are automated
solutions that guarantee higher detection rates than human
detection but the computational challenges of monitoring
verbal communications are many. Non-verbal behavior
monitoring for deception detection is an alternative path that
can be used as a leading or complimentary detection solution.
A coordinated effort is required to test these solutions on
different platforms and advance the field of social media
identity deception detection.

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[9]
[10]
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[13]

[14]
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